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This article is an investigation into the causes of entrepreneurial alertness, the 
ability of entrepreneurs to spot new business opportunities in the environment. 
By drawing from decision theory and schema theory, a model is developed to 
show  how  changes  in  the  environment  are  mediated  by  entrepreneurial 
alertness and brought to the situated attention of entrepreneurs for evaluation. 
Entrepreneurial alertness is seen to be the application of unique schemata 
that allow the entrepreneur to impute meaning to environmental change that 
would not be imputed by other managers. It is argued that this arises from 
differences  in  schematic  richness,  schematic  association,  and  schematic 
priming.  These  three  antecedents  may  therefore  form  a  basis  on  which 
enhanced entrepreneurial alertness can be developed. 
 
Field of Research: Entrepreneurship; Entrepreneurial alertness, Opportunity 





Innovation and growth in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is the result of 
an  entrepreneurial  process  in  which  managers  spot  new  market  opportunities, 
develop  plans  to  exploit  the  opportunities,  acquire  the  resources  necessary  to 
implement these plans, and execute these actions in their firms. This process is most 
contingent  on  the  critical  first  step  –  the  ability  of  entrepreneurs  to  be  alert  to 
changes in their environments and to the business opportunities that may be hidden 
within  these  changes.  Empirical  observation  suggests  that  individual  people  can 
differ  widely  in  their  ability  to  see  new  business  opportunities  within  a  given 
environmental  situation.  Some  see  nothing  but  constraint  and  status  quo,  while 
others see attractive new opportunities lurking everywhere. The social and economic 
impact  of  these  differences  is  enormous,  as  the  economic  actions  taken  by 
entrepreneurs can have wide-ranging effects on the provision of valued products and 
services,  on the creation and smooth  operation  of  new markets, and  on  regional 
socio-economic  development.  Entrepreneurial  actions  matter  in  the 
commercialization of the fruit of R&D efforts, the satisfaction of marketplace needs, 
and the creation of high-value jobs. 
 
The possibility of these many benefits is contingent upon an individual entrepreneur 
noticing  some  change  in  the  environment  and  discerning  within  that  change  an 
opportunity for profit. The ability to spot opportunity is the critical first step in the 
entrepreneurial process. The critical question of the initial discernment remains. Our 
current best understanding of this phenomenon is “entrepreneurial alertness”. 
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According the Kirzner, entrepreneurial alertness refers to “the ability to notice without 
search opportunities that have hitherto been overlooked” (Kirzner, 1979: 48), or “a 
sense of what might be ‘around the corner’, i.e., the sense to notice that which has 
hitherto not been suspected of existing at all” (Kirzner, 2008: 12). These definitions, 
while  intuitively  illustrative,  lack  a  clear  theoretical  underpinning.  Clearly,  though, 
entrepreneurial alertness is conceptually distinct from the subsequent assessment, 
evaluation  and  development  of  an  opportunity,  and  the  activities  undertaken  to 
subsequently exploit the opportunity. This alertness is not solely the domain of the 
equilibrium-seeking  arbitrageur-entrepreneur  commonly  ascribed  to  Kirzner,  but 
applies  equally  to  the  equilibrium-destroying  creative-destruction  entrepreneur  of 
Schumpeter (1942). Both types of entrepreneur need to be alert to opportunities for 
arbitrage, whether in the conditions of the present or in the hypothesized conditions 
of the future (Kirzner, 2008). 
 
While  arguing  persuasively  that  entrepreneurial  alertness  is  the  critical  economic 
driver of a dynamic and competitive entrepreneurial process, Kirzner did not attempt 
to explore the determinants of this alertness. And in later work, he explicitly indicates 
that the antecedents of entrepreneurial alertness remain unclear. To-date there has 
been  little  work  done  towards  a  theoretical  foundation  for  the  antecedents  of 
entrepreneurial alertness (Yu, 2001). 
 
This  gap  in  our  understanding  is  important  precisely  because  the  social  and 
economic effects of entrepreneurial alertness are so large. The primary contribution 
of  this  article  will  therefore  be  to  suggest  a  theoretical  base  for  entrepreneurial 
alertness  and  to  use  this  to  identify  determinants.  The  article  will  first  discuss 
cognitive and structural influences on the attention of entrepreneurs and their ability 
to interpret changes in the environment, and then introduce schema theory as an 
explanation for the differences in their ability to notice these changes without search. 




2. Alertness and Attention 
 
The alertness perspective on entrepreneurial behaviour begins with the occurrence 
of changes in the environment, such as technological or economic shifts that have 
potential to change the value of products and resources in some market (Kirzner, 
2008).  Some  of  these  changes  are  very  subtle  while  some  are  of  sufficient 
magnitude or salience to be noticed by individuals who are paying attention and are 
immersed in the corresponding knowledge corridors (Kaish & Gilad, 1991). These 
individuals are able to discover opportunities within these changes, and to pursue 
these opportunities through entrepreneurial business actions. 
 
The  key  role  that  is  played  by  individual  attention  and  the  noticeable  difference 
suggests an approach based on the psychology of strategic management functions, 
and particularly that of Herbert Simon (1947). Simon’s view was that the challenge of 
matching of problems, solutions, and actors within an organization is constrained by 
the limited attention capacity of individual decision-makers, and that organizations 
therefore  allocate  and  channel  environmental  stimuli  to  the  attention  of  individual 
decision-makers.  The  nexus  of  interest  is  the  allocation  of  external  stimuli  to 2
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attention-processing channels. This allocation is constrained both by limitations in 
cognitive  capacity  and  by  structural  influences.  Of  these,  the  role  of  cognitive-
capacity constraints is relatively well-understood. As Simon explained, the allocation 
of attention is primarily constrained by bounded rationality of decision-makers. It is 




2.1 Structural Constraints to Attention 
 
In contrast to the cognitive-capacity constraints of decision-makers and their effects 
on  attention  allocation,  the  structural  constraints  are  much  less  well-understood. 
Ocasio (1997) presents an initial argument wherein structural influence follows three 
steps: (1) the existing allocation rules of the organization (both formal and informal) 
influence the distribution of the attention of actors among potential channels, (2) this 
organizational allocation combines with contextual factors to instantiate a “situated” 
attention, and (3) this results in a specific focus of attention for each actor, ready to 
notice  and  respond  to  environmental  changes.  Employing  a  more  precise 
terminology, Barnett (2008) then improves upon this model by revising the steps: (1) 
contextual  structures  (e.g.,  culture  and  informal  rules)  influence  whether 
opportunities  are  enacted,  (2)  these  enacted  opportunities  are  then  processed 
through concrete structures (e.g., business processes and tools) which allocate the 
opportunities to specific attention channels,  and (3) actors within those channels use 
their situated attention to evaluate the opportunities and determine the appropriate 
organizational response. Figure 1 provides the visual representation of a combined 
Ocasio-Barnett perspective on structural influence. 
 





















The enactment of situated attention is the key organizational requirement for noticing 
environmental change; the organization is dependent on a situated or contextualized 
attention to bring the environmental change forward for evaluation by the constrained 
cognitive capacity of the decision-makers. It is at this point that attention provides the 
foundation necessary to recognize any opportunities latent in the change (Hayek, 
1952; Kirzner, 1973). Thus, it must be at this point that entrepreneurial alertness 
somehow comes into play. For this, we turn to the theory of schema. 
 
 
3. Schema Theory 
 
Human beings use a variety of strategies for dealing with the volume and complexity 
of sensory information streaming in from the world. One powerful technique is the 
use of rules, scripts, and categorizations (called “schemata”) to interpret incoming 2
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information  and  make  sense  of  it  (Neisser,  1967).  These  interpretations  are 
combined with task requirements to create the mental models that we use to solve 
problems. As figure  2 illustrates,  a schema is  a mental framework  with  “slots” to 
represent some set of real characteristics and relationships, which shapes or directs 
our interpretation of sensory phenomena. The invoked schema causes us to apply a 
particular mental image or model that ascribes meaning to what is happening, which 
we can then use to guide our subsequent reactions or behaviours. Through these 
actions we explore the objective environment and gain additional information about 
it, such as the degree to which it conforms to the causal expectations inherent in the 
activated  schema.  Finally,  this  new  information  becomes  part  of  the  “prior 
knowledge”  that  can  influence  the  invocation  of  particular  schemata  in  future 
situations (the choice of invoked schema turned out to be astute or not) or can cause 
revision or modification to schemata (the new information reinforces or contradicts 
the structure of existing schemata). 
 
















When faced with a novel situation in the world, we invoke schemata to understand 
the meaning and relationships among the various sensory stimuli. For example if an 
adult toss a ball to a child in the park, these characteristics are sufficient to invoke a 
“parent playing with child” schema – we recognize them as parent and child even if 
we have not met them before. We can then use schemata to make predictions about 
future behaviours, as we can expect they will enjoy each other’s company and then 
leave  the  park  together  later.  The  invoked  schema  stipulates  the  relationships 
among its elements (the adult is responsible for the well-being of the child, and not 
the reverse) and the range of actions that can be expected (the adult will not throw 
the ball so high or far that the child cannot reasonably catch it). These schemata are 
particularly useful to us because they reduce the attentional burden of making sense 
of the world, as this sense-making and prediction of future behaviour can happen 
automatically  without  conscious  effort (Neisser,  1967,  1976). In  another example, 
when you are in a busy restaurant it is neither necessary to keep conscious track of 
the actions of every patron nor to negotiate a way of transacting with the waiter to 
get  food  in  exchange  for  money,  because  the  “restaurant  schema”  stipulates  the 
roles and behaviours for every participant, leaving you free to focus your attention on 
making your meal selection and enjoying it when it arrives. 
 
Schemata are both situated and individuated – different people may interpret and 
react quite differently to the same situation, depending on their surrounding contexts 
and on the content of the schema they apply to the situation. Within the restaurant 2
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context  your  schema  and  mine  may  differ  significantly  based  on  our  own  prior 
experiences in restaurants, so our expectations and actions might also differ; if you 
happen to have worked as a waiter before, your schema is also likely to be more 
complex  and  developed  than  my  naive  patron  version,  making  you  aware  of  a 
greater range of relationships and possible actions. We might also differ in how a 
given  set  of  observable  characteristics  invokes  one  particular  schema  and  not 
another. The innocent childhood ball-playing might invoke in you a schema in which 
you are likely to wave at the child and retrieve for her any ball that she misses. But if 
I have recently been involved in preventing a nearby attempted child abduction, the 
same  scene  might  invoke  a  protective  schema  in  which  my  preferred  action  is 
confirm that the adult is indeed the parent of this child and not someone dangerous. 
The invocation of a “child protection” schema, rather than “join in the play”, has been 
primed by my recent bad experience. 
 
Our schemata are not static entities, but are constantly being updated in the face of 
new information about the world. In particular, when some phenomenon does not 
accord with our existing schema we must make some changes to incorporate this 
new  reality,  the  extent  of  which  depends  on  how  fundamentally  the  new 
phenomenon disagrees with our existing schemata (Neisser, 1967). If the change is 
very  minor,  it  can  be  assimilated  through  simple  accretion  of  new  attributes  of  a 
schema (if the game ends and I am surprised that the child sits on the ball while 
having lunch, I adjust my “playing ball” schema to indicate that the ball has many 
other possible uses too). If the change is more substantial it may be necessary to 
make a more substantial accommodation or tuning of schemata (perhaps the players 
abandon the ball in a ditch, showing that it was just a found object of little value, 
used for some impromptu play). And if the change goes to the root of my schema a 
complete  restructuring  of  it  and  related  schemata  might  be  necessary  (perhaps 
something bizarre occurs, like it is the adult who throws a tantrum when the child 
decides that play time is over, which forces me to completely re-examine many of my 
preconceptions about age, maturity, and family roles). 
 
Because schemata are subject to this constant updating and refinement as we learn 
new  things,  they  broadly  reflect  the  prior  knowledge,  experience,  and  culture  of 
individuals.  In  the  case  of  entrepreneurs,  their  prior  knowledge,  experience,  and 
culture may dispose them to schemata that differ from other people. This potential 
for schematic difference may be viewed as a significant example of entrepreneurial 
information asymmetry (Hayek, 1945) and may explain the influence of their being 
embedded into specific information corridors (Shane et al., 2000). 
 
 
3.1 Schemata and Entrepreneurial Alertness 
 
Kirzner’s theory of the  alert entrepreneur attempts to explain how it is that some 
individuals are able to see and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. But it is silent on 
exactly  how  these  entrepreneurial  individuals  are  able  to  make  the  leap  from  a 
noticed  change  in  environment  to  a  recognized  opportunity  for  present  or  future 
arbitrage. This is the gap that schema theory is able to fill. 
 
Since individuals can differ in the schemata they employ and they can differ in the 
context and  priming  effects of specific environmental stimuli they may  encounter, 2
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they  can  therefore  impute  very  different  meanings  to  the  same  observed 
phenomena. For example, two people both observe a long queue of people waiting 
for the cashiers at a grocery store. One invokes  a customer-service schema and 
interprets  the  situation  as  a  retailer  who  does  not  care  enough  about  customer 
service to pay the cost of providing additional cashiers. The other, however, invokes 
a  problem-solving  schema  and  interprets  the  situation  as  a  non-optimal  resource 
dependency  in  the  business.  The  second  individual  therefore  is  more  likely  to 
recognize  the  latent  opportunity  in  this  phenomenon,  and  therefore  to  see  it  as 
evidence of a market opportunity for alternative retail payment resources (e.g., self-
serve technology). This effect, whereby schematic differences influence the ability of 
an individual to interpret a phenomenon in a way that highlights opportunity, is the 
first  and  most  significant  way  in  which  schemata  may  influence  entrepreneurial 
alertness.  Figure  3  suggests  a  fully  mediating  role  that  entrepreneurial  alertness 
plays  between  noticed  change  in  the  environment  and  the  situated  attention  that 
recognizes or infers any latent opportunities. 
 











Schema do not sit passively in the mind waiting to be consciously invoked to make 
sense  of  a  given  situation;  they  actively  influence  the  filtering  and  detection  of 
sensory stimuli – the selection of which changes in the environment become noticed, 
and  what  magnitude  of  change  is  required  to  be  noticeable.  For  example,  two 
individuals driving past a neighbourhood street sale may see people walking past the 
displayed  goods  without  buying  anything  after  checking  pockets/purses  and 
discovering  that  they  are  not  carrying  any  cash.  The  first  observer,  who  lacks  a 
schema  for  retail  selling,  may  not  consciously  notice  the  situation  at  all.  But  the 
second,  having  a  finely  developed  retailing  schema,  is  more  likely  to  notice  the 
passers-by  as  being  lost  sales,  and  then  to  interpret  the  situation  as  a  need  for 
alternative payment mechanisms (such as an ability for homeowners to rent wireless 
credit-card POS terminals for the day). This means that individuals having different 
schemata will notice different environmental changes, and will be alert to different 
things. From this perspective, variation in entrepreneurial alertness is a manifestation 
of individuals having different schemata. 
 
Figure 4 presents a complete model of how the application of schemata combines 
with the structural influences of the Ocasio-Barnett view to create a situated attention 
that is alert to entrepreneurial opportunities. The alert entrepreneur, having formed a 
contextualized  intent  to  seek  new  business  opportunities,  and  by  participating  in 
concrete  activities  such  as  gathering  market  intelligence  or  assessing  currently 
available resources, presents a situated attention ready to investigate and evaluate 2
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the  opportunity  potential  of  any  phenomena  that  are  brought  to  it.  The  alert 
entrepreneur also, by virtue of prior knowledge and the priming effects of experience, 
possesses schemata that relate various types of environmental changes to various 
types  of  potential  opportunity  (for  example,  entrepreneurs  familiar  with  Drucker’s 
sources of innovation (Drucker, 1985) would be aware that every process must have 
a weak link and that profits may be available to anyone who replaces this weak link 
with something better). The alert entrepreneur is thus able to form mental images of 
the environment that are rich in potential opportunities. When these mental images 
are brought to the situated attention their latent opportunities are recognized and can 
then become the basis for entrepreneurial actions. 
 




















The model developed above is an attempt to provide a theoretical mechanism for the 
effects  long  attributed  to  entrepreneurial  alertness,  and  to  thereby  suggest  some 
antecedents  for  heightened  entrepreneurial  alertness.  It  provides  a  much  more 
detailed and specific description of the cognitive nature of entrepreneurial alertness 
and  its  relationship  to  the  attention-channelling  of  Simon  and  others,  one  which 
integrates  prior  theoretical  perspectives  of  entrepreneurship,  prior  knowledge, 
experience, environmental scanning, and entrepreneurial cognition. From this model 
three potential antecedents of entrepreneurial alertness can now be identified: 
 
Schematic  Richness.  A  single  schema  can  differ  between  individuals  by  having 
representation of more attributes or more complex relationships to other schemata, 
and in particular by whether it includes representation for business opportunities that 
are  commonly  associated.  This  difference  is  sometimes  used  to  explain  the 
differences in how experts and novices perceive situations (e.g., Chi & Feltovich, 
1981;  Krueger,  2005).  If  a  schema  for  “malfunctioning  business  process”  has 
representation for “weakest  link” then the  individual  will  be specifically  attuned to 
notice the weak link and to consider whether replacing it constitutes an opportunity. 
But if, for someone else, the schema lacks such an attribute, then that individual will 
fail to notice the weak link and any associated opportunity. Similarly, an individual is 
more likely to see opportunity in a new social fad if their schema for fads includes 
representation for how money was typically made from previous fads. As a result, 
two individuals exposed to the same environmental change and ascribing the same 2
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meaning to it may still differ dramatically in the opportunities they perceive and in the 
subsequent actions they take. From this we can suggest the following proposition: 
 
P1  Entrepreneurial alertness is heightened by having richer schemata with more 
explicit representation for economic opportunities. 
 
Schematic Association. Individuals can differ in the schemata that they possess 
and how those schemata are associated with external stimuli such as environmental 
changes. It is therefore possible that a shared stimulus will invoke a different schema 
in one individual than in another. Moreover, a schema that is habitually used may 
become automated to the degree that it is activated without choice by the individual, 
in response to key attributes of the environmental situation (Gaglio et al., 2001). In 
the earlier example of a grocery store with long cashier queues, the two observers 
differ in the degree to which they possess schemata associated with retail payments. 
These two individuals, on being exposed to the same environmental change, differ 
dramatically in the meaning they ascribe to it and the actions they could to take in 
response. From this we can suggest the following proposition: 
 
P2  Entrepreneurial  alertness  is  heightened  by  more  strongly  and  habitually 
associating environmental stimuli to those schemata that have representation 
for economic opportunities. 
 
Schematic  Priming.  Individuals  can  also  differ  in  the  availability  and  ease  of 
activation of the various schemata they possess. Two people may be walking in a 
shopping mall and entering into the food court area. Although they possess identical 
schemata, their responses may be very different. A hungry person will be acutely 
aware of this environmental change and may perceive it as an opportunity to satisfy 
their hunger, while a person who is not hungry but is desperately searching for a 
replacement  mobile  phone  will  notice  only  that  this  part  of  the  shopping  mall  is 
annoyingly devoid of telephone stores. The two people differ in which schema has 
been primed for activation and so, in response to the same environmental stimulus, 
one  smiles  while  the  other  scowls.  Among  entrepreneurs  such  differences  are 
sometimes  referred  to  as  keeping  your  “antennae”  tuned  (Gifford,  1998:  483),  or 
looking at world through “opportunity-spotting glasses” – both of which underline the 
deliberate nature of this priming by the entrepreneur. From this we can suggest the 
following proposition: 
 
P3  Entrepreneurial alertness is heightened by taking actions to prime schemata 





The foregoing understanding of entrepreneurial alertness as the application of richer, 
more  diverse  and  primed  schemata,  may  have  significant  implications  for  the 
development of alertness and the resulting spotting of opportunities. As noted earlier, 
schemata are not static for an individual entrepreneur, but are subject to accretion, 
accommodation, or restructuring the face of new non-conforming information from 
the  world.  An  individual  schema  can  be  expanded  or  changed  based  on  the 
individual’s experience with the application of that schema (e.g., new attributes can 2
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be added, and exception cases can be noted). And sets of related schemata can 
also  be  changed  through  experience  (e.g.,  boundaries  among  schemata  can  be 
redefined, and relationships such as generalization/specialization can be defined or 
modified). In particular, an individual entrepreneur can learn to develop and apply 
schemata that are richer in their attributes and connections, or can learn to associate 
and  habitually  invoke  new  and  different  schemata  in  response  to  environmental 
stimuli.  And  the  entrepreneur  can  deliberately  take  steps  to  prime  particular 
schemata for activation. 
 
On all three of these antecedent dimensions, it appears possible for the entrepreneur 
to heighten alertness. This means that it should be possible to learn, develop, and 
enhance  entrepreneurial  alertness  through  cognitive  strategies  of  schema 
modification. These modifications may be achieved through education, such as the 
inculcation and development of more complex expert schemata, and the deliberate 
association  of  expert  schema  with  environmental  stimuli  through  enhanced  prior 
knowledge  and  practice.  Schematic  modifications  may  also  be  achieved  through 
increased  entrepreneurial  experience,  such  as  formalized  and  highly  repetitive 
practice in opportunity spotting sessions, or through the positive feedback regarding 
the value of specifically enacted schema through serial entrepreneurship behaviours. 
But a necessary precursor to any such activities will be the empirical testing of the 
propositions and antecedent relationships that have been developed above, to see 
whether and to what degree these factors have influence over the level of alertness 
prospective entrepreneurs have for new opportunities. 
 
These conclusions provide important support for public policy objectives to develop 
increased  levels  of  entrepreneurship  in  the  population  through  educational  and 
experiential methods. Through education and experiential support activities it may be 
possible  to  increase  entrepreneurial  alertness  among  managers  and  business 
operators, and thereby to encourage greater entrepreneurial activity in the economy. 2
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